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ABSTRACT. What are the sources of rapid wage growth during a worker’s early career? To address this ques-
tion, I construct and estimate a model of strategic wage bargaining with on-the-job search to explore three
different components of wages: general human capital, match-speciﬁc capital, and outside option. Workers
search for alternative job opportunities on the job and accumulate human capital through learning-by-doing.
As the workers ﬁnd better job opportunities, the current employer has to compete with outside ﬁrms to retain
them. This between-ﬁrm competition improves the outside option value of the worker, which results in wage
growth on the job even when productivity remains the same. The model is estimated by a simulated minimum
distance estimator and data from the NLSY 79. The parameter estimates are used to simulate counterfactuals.
The results indicate that the improved value of outside option raises wages of ten-year-experienced workers by
16%, which accounts for about 30% of the wage growth during the ﬁrst ten years of career. I also ﬁnd that
human capital accumulation affects wage proﬁle not only because it directly changes labor productivity, but
also because it alters job search behavior due to low future productivity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wages of young workers grow rapidly. For example, a typical male high-school graduate in the U.S. can
expect 50% of wage growth during the ﬁrst ten years of his permanent transition to the labor market. This
early wage growth accounts for about two thirds of the entire wage growth over the lifetime. Given that
new entrants to the labor market can look forward to about 40 years of work, this fact implies that a major
part of wage growth occurs in a relatively short period of time. The objective of the paper is to empirically
understand the sources of wage growth of young workers.
One standard interpretation is based on the accumulation of human capital. Workers learn skills more
quickly while they are young. The rapid wage growth can be interpreted as a direct consequence of the rapid
accumulation of human capital. Another explanation is job turnover. Young workers change jobs frequently.
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1Workers start their careers without detailed knowledge about the nature of their jobs or where they can ﬁnd
better jobs. They gradually ﬁnd a better place to work. Wages grow when a worker ﬁnds a better job and
switches from the current job to a new job. Topel and Ward (1992) ﬁnd that about a third of early career
wage growth can be explained by job switching. This paper considers another source of wage growth: the
value of outside option of workers. This effect can increase wages even when a worker stays with the same
employer and productivity remains the same.
In the model employed workers are occasionally contacted by ﬁrms other than the current employer.
When the value of the offer is better than that of the current employment contract, the worker wants to quit
the current job to accept the offer. However, the current employer may be willing to pay the worker a higher
wage to retain him. In this way, offers from outside ﬁrms improve the bargaining position of a worker when
he renegotiates wages with the current employer. Wages can grow due to an increase in outside option value,
even when productivity remains the same. A worker is in a position of renegotiation, because rent from a
match exists due to search frictions. Workers do not have alternative job opportunities in hand, while ﬁrms
are not able to immediately ﬁnd new workers that replace the current employees. Finding an alternative
partner who is as good as the current partner is more difﬁcult when agents are heterogeneous, because the
agents similar to the current partner can be scarce in the market. This labor market friction is a source of the
rent from a worker-ﬁrm match.
Understanding the sources of wage growth is important for active labor market policies. If a large fraction
of wage growth is due to the labor market frictions, policies that attempt to accelerate matching process will
have signiﬁcant effect on individual wages. Public Employment Services that assist job search not only
reduce unemployment, but also enhance the wage growth of employed workers.
To consider the effects of outside option value, match quality, and human capital accumulation on wages,
I develop and estimate a model of on-the-job search with strategic bargaining. The model is based on a
continuous-time search model in which unemployed and employed workers search for jobs that are char-
acterized by idiosyncratic match quality. On the one hand, employed workers accumulate human capital
through learning-by-doing. On the other hand, they occasionally receive job offers from new potential em-
ployers. When the match quality with a new potential employer is high enough, a bargaining game begins
among three-players: the worker, the current employer, and a new potential employer who attempts to re-
cruit him. In this three-player bargaining, a worker ﬁrst bargains with a ﬁrm that is strategically chosen
by the worker. He then bargains with the other ﬁrm if the bargaining with the ﬁrst ﬁrm is not successful.
The worker exploits these multiple job opportunities and uses a ﬁrm as a threat in bargaining with another
2ﬁrm. Wages grow over the duration of a job, not only because workers accumulate human capital, but also
because they receive job offers, which improves their value of outside option.
1
Mywork isrelated tothe paperby Postel-Vinayand Robin(2002) thatanalyzes wagedispersion inFrance
using a model of on-the-job search with counteroffers. Although their model has some similar features to my
model, they focus on wage distribution in a stationary equilibrium, instead of wage dynamics. To address
the question of sources of wage growth, my model departs from their previous contributions in two ways.
First, the model allows for productivity growth of workers through learning-by-doing. The productivity
growth contributes to wage growth, because it increases not only the value of a match, but also the value
of outside option such as unemployment. The intuition is that experienced workers are more likely to get
employed and that they would have higher value of a match if they are employed. My empirical results
suggest that the growth of worker productivity actually explains the largest part of wage growth. Second,
wage renegotiation following idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered in this paper. The model by
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) does not predict any wage decreases on the job and it assumes exogenous
destruction of a match. In contrast, in my model productivity shocks may cause a wage decrease on the job
and a separation endogenously occurs if a match becomes inefﬁcient due to negative productivity shocks.
The price of these extensions is that an explicit solution to the equilibrium wage and its distribution are too
complicated to be derived analytically because of nonstationarity. I use a numerical solution for simulation
and estimation of the model. These extensions are important to match the observed dynamics of wages and
worker ﬂows.
The main contribution of the paper is to empirically explore the effect of labor market frictions on wages
of young workers. The structural parameters of the model are estimated by a simulated minimum distance
estimator using a sample of white male high school graduates from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979. The parameter estimates are used to simulate three counterfactuals. The ﬁrst exercise evaluates
the effect of the improved outside option value on wages. I ﬁnd that wages of ten-year-experienced workers
would be 16% lower, if their outside option is unemployment, not the employer with the second best match.
This result indicates that the effect of the improved value of outside option is substantial and it accounts for
about 30% of the observed wage growth during the ﬁrst ten years. In the second simulation, labor market
friction is shut off so that workers are able to ﬁnd the best matches immediately. In the absence of frictions,
wage growth is solely driven by the accumulation of human capital. In this simulation, wages grow by
1Barron, Berger, and Black (2005) provide empirical analysis for counteroffers using the data from the 2001 Small Business
Administration Survey. They ﬁnd that factors that are likely to raise match rents indeed increase the likelihood that a ﬁrm will
extend a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer. This empirical evidence supports the theoretical argument in this
paper.
325% during the ﬁrst ten years of their careers, which implies that only about a half of the observed wage
growth reﬂects the accumulation of human capital. The third simulation imposes that human capital does not
grow. I ﬁnd that human capital accumulation affects wage proﬁle not only because it directly changes labor
productivity, but also because it alters job search behavior. A lack of human capital accumulation reduces
the value of a match, and thus, it increases the reservation match quality. As a result, the initial wage in
the career is raised by 15%, but wages grow only by 15% in the ﬁrst ten years. The mean unemployment
duration is also increased by 20%. The results suggest that human capital accumulation has important
implication on job search and that they should be considered together.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The following section reviews the related literature. The theoretical
model is presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the data. The estimation strategy is detailed and the
results are presented in section 4. To evaluate the effect of human capital and labor market frictions on
wages, the parameter estimates are used to simulate counterfactuals in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs and technical details are gathered in appendices.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Setup. I consider the labor market for inﬁnitely lived ex ante heterogeneous workers and ex post het-
erogeneous ﬁrms. Both the workers and the ﬁrms are risk neutral, have the same discount rate r, and have
complete access to the capital market. Workers are heterogeneous with respect to innate ability γ0 and
general human capital h. Innate ability is ﬁxed for each individual’s lifetime, while general human capital
grows with work experience. Both are precisely observed by all agents in the economy.
Unemployed workers receive utility value b, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary unemployment
beneﬁts, and meet a ﬁrm at a rate of λ0. Employed workers receive a ﬂow wage payment w and produce
a ﬂow output y. They are also contacted by ﬁrms other than the current employer at a rate of λ. When a
worker is contacted by a ﬁrm, match quality θ and an idiosyncratic shock to the match θ are drawn from
distributions with CDFs F and G, respectively. Both θ and θ are bounded above θMAX, θ,MAX and
below θMIN, θ,MIN. All workers and ﬁrms precisely observe the values of the match quality θ and the
idiosyncratic shock θ. The accumulation of match-speciﬁc human capital is captured by a stochastic growth
of match quality. This modeling saves the amount of computation because no additional state variable such
as tenure is used, although an alternative (and more common) way is that match-speciﬁc capital grows with
tenure. The match quality grows from θ to θ+(θ) at the Poisson rate of δ1(θ). The idiosyncratic shock
changes occasionally at the Poisson rate of δ.
4Firms are ex post heterogeneous in the sense that match quality varies across ﬁrms. However, they are ex
ante homogeneous because neither workers nor ﬁrms know their match quality until they meet. A match is
exogenously destroyed at a rate δ0 due to family problem, health problem, and etc.
General human capital is accumulated through learning-by-doing while workers are employed and it does
not depreciate. This implies that human capital does not change while workers are unemployed. Hence I
have h(t + a) ≥ h(t) ∀a > 0 where t is the index for time and equality holds only when workers are
unemployed from period t to period t+a. I also assume that human capital does not grow once it reaches a
certain level ¯ h < ∞.
The output y produced by a worker-ﬁrm match is strictly increasing in innate ability γ0, general human
capital h, match quality θ, and idiosyncratic shock to the match θ. For example, the production function
can take a multiplicative form y = exp(γ0 + γ1h + γ2h2) · θ · θ where γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0.
The assumption that all workers meet ﬁrms at the same rate and draw match quality from the common
distribution may seem restrictive, because high-skilled workers should receive more job offers and face a
better distribution of job opportunities. This observation is plausible and it is also true in the model. The
intuition is that I distinguish between meeting rates (λ and λ0) and offer rates. In the model, the high-
skilled workers receive more job offers than the low-skilled workers when they meet the same number of
ﬁrms. Firms are less likely to employ unskilled workers because they are unproductive. Moreover, high-
skilled workers face a better distribution of job opportunities, even though all workers have the common
match quality distribution F. To see this, consider the distribution of productivity of a match, rather than
the distribution of match quality. The distribution that high-skilled workers face is better than that for low-
skilled workers in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance because the productivity is increasing in
innate ability and human capital. For example, if the production technology is additive in workers’ skill and
match quality, workers’ skill shifts the productivity distribution to the right.2
2.2. Wage Bargaining.
2.2.1. Bilateral bargaining between an unemployed worker and a ﬁrm. Unemployed workers receive un-
employment beneﬁt b and meet a ﬁrm at the Poisson rate of λ0. When an unemployed worker meets a ﬁrm,
the match quality θ and idiosyncratic shock θ to the match are randomly determined. The worker and the
ﬁrm bargain over an employment contract given all relevant information such as skill and match quality.
2Strictly speaking, the value of a job is not measured by the productivity at the time when a worker and a ﬁrm meet. But, as I will
see below, the value of a job is strictly increasing in the initial productivity and the argument here still works.
5Once the contract is signed, the ﬁrm pays a constant ﬂow of wage w and the worker supplies ﬂow of la-
bor service until the contract is renegotiated or separation occurs. The contract is renegotiable with mutual
consent. Also, workers can quit a job and ﬁrms can ﬁre workers at any time.
Let Θ = {θ,θ} be the vector of match quality and idiosyncratic shock to the match. The continuation
values of employed workers and ﬁrms are denoted by U(h,Θ,w) and V (h,Θ,w), respectively. Let U0(h)
be the continuation value for unemployed workers. I omit the innate ability γ0 in the notation, because it is
constant over time. The ﬁrms’ value of a vacancy is zero because of the free entry condition. For notational
convenience, I deﬁne the joint value J(h,Θ),
J(h,Θ) = U(h,Θ,w) + V (h,Θ,w).
Observe that w does not change the joint value J, although it certainly changes the allocation. This will be
clear when I see the condition for job turnover and the equilibrium payoffs in the case of job turnover, which
are both independent of wages.
The equilibrium payoffs and wage are determined by the Nash bargaining solution. The equilibrium is
characterized as follows
(1) J(h,Θ) < U0(h): If the match is inefﬁcient, they immediately separate to look for other potential
partners. The resulting payoffs are {U0(h),0},
(2) J(h,Θ) ≥ U0(h): If the match is efﬁcient, they sign a contract immediately and the resulting
payoffs are
{U(h,Θ,w),V (h,Θ,w)} = {βJ(h,Θ) + (1 − β)U0(h), (1 − β)(J(h,Θ) − U0(h))}
where β is a measure of bargaining power of a worker.
The worker’s threat point is U0 and the ﬁrm’s threat point is 0. They split the surplus J −U0 and the worker
takes his fraction of β as well as U0. The contract is signed only when the match is efﬁcient.
2.2.2. Multilateral bargaining between a worker and two ﬁrms. Employed workers are contacted by ﬁrms
other than the current employer at a rate λ. When a worker meets a ﬁrm, the worker draws a match quality
with the new ﬁrm and an idiosyncratic shock to the match. The outcome is precisely observed by the worker,
the new ﬁrm, and the incumbent ﬁrm.
Dey and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) consider the equilibrium of this three-
player bargaining. Dey and Flinn (2005) impose an axiomatic Nash bargaining solution assuming that
6the worker’s threat point is the match value with the losing ﬁrm. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006)
analyzes this bargaining problem using a strategic model and ﬁnd a particular bargaining procedure that
can support the assumption used by Dey and Flinn (2005). Given these two previous papers, I assume that
the threat point of the worker is the match value with the ﬁrm that has a lower match quality. Thus, the
difference between the two match values is the surplus.
Let ΘC and ΘN be the vectors of match quality and idiosyncratic shocks to the match with the current
employer and the new potential employer, respectively. In the following, I assume that the match with the
current employer is efﬁcient. This is actually true in equilibrium because no inefﬁcient matches exist. Also,
the worker prefers the current employer to the new potential employer and he prefers not bargaining when
he is indifferent. The equilibrium outcome is summarized as follows
(1) J(h,ΘC) ≥ J(h,ΘN) and U(h,ΘC,w) ≥ βJ(h,ΘC) + (1 − β)J(h,ΘN): the worker does not
initiate bargaining. The worker stays with the current employer and the current contract remains
effective.
(2) J(h,ΘC) ≥ J(h,ΘN) and βJ(h,ΘC) + (1 − β)J(h,ΘN) > U(h,ΘC,w): the worker bargains
with the current employer to induce a counteroffer. The outcome is that the worker stays with
the current employer and he is promoted. The equilibrium payoffs of the worker and the current
employer are βJ(h,ΘC)+(1−β)J(h,ΘN) and (1−β)[J(h,ΘC)−J(h,ΘN)], respectively. The
new ﬁrm fails to recruit the worker and receives the value of vacancy, which is zero.
(3) J(h,ΘN) > J(h,ΘC): the worker bargains with the new potential employer. The outcome is
that the worker quits the current employer to take an offer from the new potential employer. The
equilibrium payoffs of the worker and the new potential employer are βJ(h,ΘN)+(1−β)J(h,ΘC)
and (1−β)[J(h,ΘN)−J(h,ΘC)], respectively. The incumbent ﬁrm loses the worker and receives
the value of vacancy, which is zero.
2.2.3. Renegotiation in response to a productivity shock. An idiosyncratic productivity shock to a match θ
occasionally changes at a rate δ. The new shock is drawn independently from the previous shocks. Firms
and workers may want to renegotiate the contract in response to the shock. I assume the following wage
renegotiation rule.3
(1) J(h,Θ) ≥ U0(h) and V (h,Θ,w) ≥ 0: When the match remains efﬁcient and the participation
constraint of the ﬁrm is still satisﬁed, they keep the current contract.
3Postel-Vinay and Turon (2006) applies the same wage rule to demonstrate that i.i.d. productivity shocks generate persistent wage
dynamics. Assuming serially uncorrelated shocks, they are able to characterize wage dynamics analytically.
7(2) J(h,Θ) ≥ U0(h)andV (h,Θ,w) < 0: Whenthematchremainsefﬁcientbuttheﬁrm’sparticipation
constraint is not satisﬁed, wage is cut so that the ﬁrm’s participation constraint is satisﬁed with
equality. The updated wage w∗ gives the worker the continuation value J(h,Θ) and it gives the ﬁrm
zero.
(3) J(h,Θ) < U0(h): When the match becomes inefﬁcient, separation occurs. The worker’s value is
U0(h) and the ﬁrm opens vacancy and receives zero.
Notice that a positive productivity shock does not cause a renegotiation because it does not make a ﬁrm or
a worker worse off and thus, the participation constraints do not get violated due to the shock. Also, the
participation constraint of the worker does not get violated due to the shock unless it is already violated
before the bargaining is initiated. Of course, this does not happen in equilibrium.
Harris and Holmstrom (1982) ﬁnd that this wage contract is optimal for risk-averse workers who cannot
commit to remaining in the job. The intuition is that these wage dynamics minimize the ﬂuctuation of wages
given a lack of commitment, and thus they are preferred by risk-averse agents. Another interpretation is that
the proposed wage dynamics minimize the deviation from the ex ante optimal wage dynamics in the case of
full commitment. Although I assume that agents are risk-neutral for analytical simplicity, this argument is
still applicable if workers are even slightly risk-averse.
Endogenous separation is an important property from empirical viewpoint. In the model, matches with
high-skilled or experienced workers are more likely to survive negative productivity shocks than those with
low-skilled or inexperienced workers. Matches are destroyed when they become inefﬁcient. Workers who
have high labor productivity are unlikely to become unemployed. This prediction of the model is consistent
with many empirical ﬁndings. These wage dynamics and worker mobility are useful for a quantitative
analysis.4
2.3. Value Function. I have not discussed how value functions are deﬁned in terms of the primitives of the
model. The next proposition provides the existence and the uniqueness of the value functions.
4Wages are assumed to be constant until renegotiation. Alternative assumption is that wage is a product of efﬁciency unit of labor
and its price and that the price of efﬁciency unit of labor is constant until renegotiation. However, the model does not ﬁt the observed
patterns in the data. More speciﬁcally, the model does not match the employment hazard rate and the wage variance simultaneously.
In this speciﬁcation, all variations in productivity are translated into variations in wages. If I allow for endogenous separation and
the model matches the observed employment hazard rate, the model generates too large wage variance compared with the observed
wage variance. In contrast, my original speciﬁcation in which agents negotiate wages ﬁts both the employment hazard rate and the
wage variance simultaneously, because productivity is not directly translated into wages. The detailed discussion and the simulation
results are provided in the appendix.
8Proposition2.1. ThevaluefunctionsU, V, U0,andJ areuniquelydeterminedbythefollowingcontraction
mappings. The value of unemployment U0 is given by
(r + λ0)U0(h) = b + λ0EX max[βJ(h,X) + (1 − β)U0(h), U0(h)]
where X is a vector of the new match quality and idiosyncratic shock. The joint value of the match J is
given by
(r + λ + δ0 + δ1(θ) + δ)J(h,Θ)
= y(h,Θ) + λPr(J(h,X) > J(h,Θ)) ·
EX[βJ(h,X) + (1 − β)J(h,Θ)|J(h,X) > J(h,Θ)]
+δ0U0(h) + δ1(θ)J(h,Θ+(θ)) + δEX max[J(h,X), U0(h)] + ˙ J(h,Θ).
The continuation value for the worker U and the continuation value for the ﬁrm V are given by
(r + λ + δ0 + δ1(θ) + δ)U(h,Θ,w)
= w + λEX max[βJ(h,X) + (1 − β)J(h,Θ),
βJ(h,Θ) + (1 − β)J(h,X), U(h,Θ,w)] + δ0U0(h)
+δ1(θ)U(h,Θ+(θ),w) + δEX max[min{U(h,X,w), J(h,X)}, U0(h)] + ˙ U(h,Θ,w)
(r + λ + δ0 + δ1(θ) + δ)V (h,Θ,w)
= y(h,Θ) − w + λPr(J(h,X) ≤ J(h,Θ)) ·
EX min[(1 − β)(J(h,Θ) − J(h,X)), V (h,Θ,w)|J(h,X) ≤ J(h,Θ)]
+δ1(θ)V (h,Θ+(θ),w) + δEX max[V (h,X,w),0] + ˙ V (h,Θ,w).
Proof. The value of unemployment U0 is determined by the following asset pricing equation,
(r + λ0)U0(h) = b + λ0EX max[βJ(h,X) + (1 − β)U0(h), U0(h)]
where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the ﬂow of unemployment beneﬁt and the second term cap-
tures the value when the worker meets a ﬁrm. Notice that there is no human capital accumulation while
unemployed. Given J, the equation deﬁnes a contraction mapping for U0.
The value of employment U is determined by the following asset pricing equation,
9(r + λ + δ0 + δ1(θ) + δ)U(h,Θ,w)
= w + λEX max[βJ(h,X) + (1 − β)J(h,Θ),
βJ(h,Θ) + (1 − β)J(h,X), U(h,Θ,w)] + δ0U0(h)
+δ1(θ)U(h,Θ+(θ),w) + δEX max[min{U(h,X,w), J(h,X)}, U0(h)] + ˙ U(h,Θ,w)
where ˙ U is a time-derivative term, which is given by ˙ U = dU/dh · dh/dt. The second term on the right
hand side captures the change of the continuation value when the worker is contacted by a ﬁrm other than
the current employer. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst element in the bracket is the value from job turnover, the second
element is the value from being promoted, and the third element is the value of remaining in the current
employment contract. The third term captures the value of exogenous separation. The value of the growth
of match quality is captured by the fourth term. The ﬁfth term captures the continuation value when an
exogenous shock hits the match. The ﬁrst element is the value of keeping the current contract, the second
element is the value from renegotiation (wage cut), and the third element is the value from being ﬁred
(separation.) Given J and U0, the recursive equation above deﬁnes a contraction mapping for U.
Similarly, the ﬁrm’s value of ﬁlling a position is determined by the asset pricing equation,
(r + λ + δ0 + δ1(θ) + δ)V (h,Θ,w)
= y(h,Θ) − w + λPr(J(h,X) ≤ J(h,Θ)) ·
EX min[(1 − β)(J(h,Θ) − J(h,X)), V (h,Θ,w)|J(h,X) ≤ J(h,Θ)]
+δ1(θ)V (h,Θ+(θ),w) + δEX max[V (h,X,w),0] + ˙ V (h,Θ,w).
where ˙ V is a time-derivative term. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the income from output, the
second term is the labor cost, the third term captures the continuation value when the employee receives
outside offers. The value of match quality growth is captured by the fourth term. The ﬁfth term captures the
continuation value when a productivity shock hits the match. In the third term, the ﬁrst element is the value
of promoting the employee to retain him and the second element is the value from remaining in the current
contract. In the fourth term, the ﬁrst element is the value when the contract remains the same and the second
element is the value from ﬁring (separation) or the value of employment when wage cut occurs. Given J,
the Bellman equation deﬁnes a contraction mapping for V .
Finally I solve the value function J. Combining the worker’s value function U and the ﬁrm’s value
function V , I ﬁnd the joint value function J,
10(r + λ + δ0 + δ1(θ) + δ)J(h,Θ)
= y(h,Θ) + λPr(J(h,X) > J(h,Θ)) ·
EX[βJ(h,X) + (1 − β)J(h,Θ)|J(h,X) > J(h,Θ)]
+δ0U0(h) + δ1(θ)J(h,Θ+(θ)) + δEX max[J(h,X), U0(h)] + ˙ J(h,Θ).
Notice that the joint value J is independent of wages as I mentioned at the beginning of the section, because
the wage only affects the allocation, not the size of the rent. This Bellman equation deﬁnes a contraction
mapping for J given U0. 
The equilibrium wage is set so that the worker’s continuation value U(h,Θ,w) equals his payoff from
the bargaining. Suppose that the wage is determined through bargaining among three players, and that the
type-Θ ﬁrm wins and the type-Θ0 ﬁrm loses. The equilibrium wage w∗ satisﬁes
U(h,Θ,w∗) = βJ(h,Θ) + (1 − β)J(h,Θ0) (1)
where the left-hand side is the payoff in a three-player bargaining which is independent of wage. The
continuation value for a worker U is strictly and monotonically increasing in wage w, which is clear from
the Bellman equation shown above. The equilibrium wage is uniquely determined so that the continuation
value for the worker equals the payoff obtained from the bargaining. I ﬁnd it intractable to derive an explicit
solution to the equilibrium wage w∗. The wage is numerically derived in the following empirical sections.
3. DATA
3.1. Sampling Criteria. The data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979
which includes information on the weekly work history of individuals from 1978 through 2002. The survey
consists of individuals who were 14-21 years old as of January 1, 1979. There are some advantages from
using the NLSY to analyze career. First, the NLSY has a rich work history. In particular, more than one
job is recorded in a survey year. Young workers frequently switch jobs and having more than one job in
a year is not uncommon. To understand how young workers build their careers, it is important to record
job switching as accurately as possible. Second, the survey period covers the initial transition to the labor
market. I am particularly interested in the wages and labor mobility of young workers. The NLSY focuses
on this part of the life cycle.
11I use a sample of white male high school graduates for the following reasons. First, I consider the labor
market to be heterogeneous across race, sex, and education. Second, this is the largest demographic group
if I take a subset of individuals in terms of the conditions given in the ﬁrst point. Third, this group is the
most commonly used for wage and worker mobility analysis in the literature and thus, my results can be
compared to the previous contributions to some extent.
Following Farber and Gibbons (1996), I limit my sample to jobs that were held after an individual ﬁrst
made a primary commitment to become a full-time worker. I say that an individual has made a long-term
transition to the labor market if he works in full-time jobs for six or more quarters during three years after
graduating. A full-time job is deﬁned as a job that consists of 30 or more hours per week worked. I also
omit self-employed jobs and jobs without pay. Details of the construction of the data set are contained in
appendix A.3. The ﬁnal sample consists of 9,462 observations for 662 individuals and 3,882 full-time jobs.
3.2. Variable Deﬁnitions.
3.2.1. Wages. Hourly wages are computed by dividing weekly earnings by hours worked per week. If
earnings or hours per week worked are recorded on a monthly or an annual basis, I convert them to weekly
data. Wages are deﬂated by the monthly consumer price index of the year of 2004.
3.2.2. Job-to-Job Transition Indicator. I say that an individual makes a job-to-job transition if (1) he stays
unemployed or has a part-time job for three weeks or less before he starts working for a new job and (2) he
leaves the job voluntarily. Otherwise, I say that an individual changes jobs via non full-time employment.
For example, if a worker is unemployed for four weeks between jobs, I say that he changes jobs via non
full-time employment. Bowlus, Kiefer, and Neumann (2001) deﬁne job-to-job transition as the condition
(1) only. But condition (2) is also relevant for my analysis because between-ﬁrm competition must occur in
the model whenever job-to-job transition occurs.
4. ESTIMATION
4.1. Solution and Simulation Method.
4.1.1. Empirical Speciﬁcation. I allow for worker heterogeneity in terms of productivity. The productivity
of a type i worker who has h years of experience, match quality θ, and an idiosyncratic productivity shock
θ is given by
yi(h,θ,θ) = exp(γ0,i + γ1h + γ2h2 + γ3h3 + γ4h4) · θ · θ. (2)
12The distribution of individual types is assumed to have two support points: low-skilled and high-skilled. I
normalize the low-skilled type as γ0,LOW = 0. The parameters to be estimated are the support point for
high-skilled type γ0,HIGH and its weight pHIGH. The sampling distribution of match quality is assumed
to be lognormal, lnθ ∼ N(µ,σ2
θ). I discretize match quality into M support points so that each point is
equally distant. Let θm be the match quality at the m-th level (1 ≤ m ≤ M). When the match quality with
the current employer is θm, match quality grows θm+1 at the Poisson rate δ1(θm),
δ1(θm) = δ1a + δ1bm if 1 ≤ m < M
0 otherwise.
The distribution of productivity shocks is assumed to have two support points: bad state and good state.
Because it is imposed that Eθ = 1 for normalization, I only have to estimate the support point of bad state
θ,BAD and its weight pBAD. I also assume wages are measured with error but this error is unbiased relative
to the true log wage lnw∗,
lnw = lnw∗ + 
 ∼ N(0,σ2
)
where lnw is the observed wage. This measurement error is necessary for estimation because I will match
not only the conditional mean of wages, but also the conditional variance of wages. The interest rate r is
set to 0.075. The parameter for bargaining power β is ﬁxed5 at 0.5 for identiﬁcation purpose, which will be
discussed in the section 4.4.
4.1.2. Model Implementation. The model is numerically solved using a contraction mapping in discretized
state space. Match quality is discretized to 20 levels. They are equally distant and their weights are given
by the method proposed by Kennan (2006). The lowest match quality is at 2.5% quantile and the highest
is at 97.5% quantile. Wages are discretized to 35 levels. The lowest hourly wages on the grid is $1.0 and
the highest is $45.0. This grid turns out not to be restrictive because any simulated wage is on either of
these boundaries in the estimation. For a numerical solution of a continuous time model, the model must be
converted into a discrete time model. The length of a decision period is assumed to be a quarter (13 weeks.)
This relatively ﬁne grid is especially relevant while agents are young, because they change jobs frequently
and have multiple jobs during a year. If I use a year as a decision period, I would lose more information
5As an additional result, I also estimated this parameter. The results can be found in the appendix.
13about the early careers of young workers. All events described by Poisson process with the rate a in the
continuous time model are approximated by a Bernoulli process with the rate a∆h where ∆h (= 0.25) is the
length of the period in the discretized model. Each individual is simulated for K (= 10) times from his ﬁrst
transition to the labor market until his ﬁrst exits from the labor market or the survey ends.
It is important to match the length of survey and the length of simulation so that I can re-generate the ac-
tual sampling process. Suppose I am interested in the conditional mean wage given ten years of experience.
If the agents are simulated for ten years, more productive workers are likely to be included in the simulated
sample of workers with ten years of experience, because high-skilled workers tend to be more experienced.
On the contrary, if the simulation length is as long as one hundred years, probably all types of workers will
be included in the simulated sample of workers with ten years of experience. Due to the sampling mecha-
nism, the conditional mean wage will be higher in the former simulated sample. The simulation length can
affect the auxiliary model parameter estimates and thus, matching it with the survey length is important in
the estimation.
4.2. Model Estimator. The parameters of the model are estimated by a simulated minimum distance esti-
mator, which is closely related to the simulated method of moments, the efﬁcient method of moments, and
indirect inference.6 The model is simulated to generate an artiﬁcial data set of employment history and wage
path. This simulated data is summarized by descriptive statistics such as hazard rate of job and unemploy-
ment, wage growth rate, and wage variance. These summary statistics of simulated data are compared with
the corresponding statistics of actual data. The objective of estimation is to look for structural parameters
that give the best ﬁt. Summary statistics used in a simulated minimum distance estimator are called auxiliary
parameters. Auxiliary parameters are often moments of data, but they can be parameters of a reduced form
model. For example, coefﬁcients of a wage regression are used as auxiliary parameters.
There are a few reasons to use simulated minimum distance estimator to estimate the model. First,
implementation is straightforward. For example, maximum likelihood is computationally too demanding
for my model because it requires me to integrate out serially correlated unobserved state variables. In
particular, the match quality in one job is correlated with those in other jobs. The match quality with
an alternative job opportunity is also correlated over time, even when the worker does not change jobs. In
addition, idiosyncraticshocksalsoneedtobeintegratedout, becausetheychangeonlyoccasionally. Second,
I directly match the important features of the data. By looking at the gap between auxiliary parameter of the
6See Carrasco and Florens (2002) for a survey.
14data (i.e., summary statistics of the data) and their simulated counterparts, I can tell which features of the
data the model fails to ﬁt.
Thesimulatedminimumdistanceestimatorminimizesthecriterionfunctionthatisdeﬁnedastheweighted
average of the squared distance between the sample auxiliary parameters and the corresponding simulated
auxiliary parameters. Let φ be the vector of structural parameters. The vector of sample auxiliary parameter
estimated from the NLSY is denoted by ˆ ρ. The vector of simulated auxiliary parameter computed from a
simulated data set with K simulations is denoted by ρK. The simulated minimum distance estimator ˆ φ is
deﬁned as
ˆ φ = argmin
φ
[ρK(φ) − ˆ ρ]0W[ρK(φ) − ˆ ρ]
where W is a positive deﬁnite matrix. The variance of the estimated structural parameters is minimized
when the weighting matrix W is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters. Notice
that an auxiliary parameter is a function of structural parameters. The choice of auxiliary parameters affects
efﬁciency and they should be good descriptions of the data. One interpretation is that I see the data through
the “lens” of a descriptive statistical model. When the optimal weighting matrix W∗ is used, the covariance
matrix for the structural parameters is given by







where W∗ = V ar(ˆ ρ)−1, g(φ) = ρ(φ) − ˆ ρ, and K is the number of simulation.
4.3. Auxiliary Models. The auxiliary parameters that describe employment history data are hazard rates
of full-time job spells {pJ,t}40
t=1, full-time employment spells {pF,t}40
t=1, and non full-time employment
spells {pN,t}5
t=1. Non full-time employment includes part-time employment and unemployment. A spell
of non full-time employment ends if a worker ﬁnds a new full-time job. The hazard rate of non full-time
employment captures the transition from unemployment or part-time employment to full-time employment.
A spell of full-time employment ends if a worker loses a full-time job and gets unemployed or switches to
a new part-time job. Thus, the hazard rate of full-time employment captures the transition from full-time
employment to unemployment or part-time employment. Lastly, a spell of full-time job ends if a worker
loses full-time employment status or he switches to another full-time employment. The hazard rate of full-
time job captures the job-to-job transition as well as a transition to non full-time employment. Quarterly
hazard rates of full-time job spells (up to 40 quarters), full-time employment spells (up to 40 quarters),
15and non full-time employment spells (up to 5 quarters) are nonparametrically estimated by a Kaplan-Meier
estimator using both censored and non-censored spells. The length of the periods is chosen so that roughly






where Nt is the number of jobs that end at quarter t and NC
t is the number job spells that are censored at
quarter t.
The auxiliary parameters that describe the wage data are the average log wage conditional on general
work experience, within-job wage growth rate, and within-individual wage growth rate. Let wijt, GXijt
and TNijt be log wage, experience, and tenure of individual i when he works for employer j in period
t. Following Murphy and Welch (1990), the average log wage conditional on general work experience is
estimated by OLS with quartic term,
wijt = β0,OLS + β1,OLSGXijt + β2,OLSGX2 + β3,OLSGX3 + β4,OLSGX4 + ijt
whereijt isastatisticalerror. ThecoefﬁcientsβOLS andtheresidualvarianceσ2
OLS areusedastheauxiliary
parameters. This auxiliary model provides a parametrically estimated conditional mean and variance of
log wage given experience. Notice that the estimated coefﬁcients should not be interpreted as returns to
experience because of endogeneity. In particular, experience and unobserved innate ability are positively
correlated. This motivates me to estimate within-individual wage growth rate using a ﬁxed effect model.
Denote the average log wage and experience of individual i by wi and GXi. Let ˜ wijt = wijt − ¯ wi be the
deviation of log wage from the average over the entire job history of individual i. I also deﬁne the averages
and the deviations for GX and  in a similar way. The ﬁxed effect model for within-individual wage growth
is given by
˜ wijt = β1,FE g GXijt + β2,FE ] GX2
ijt + β3,FE ] GX3
ijt + β4,FE ] GX4
ijt + ˜ ijt.
Notice that I use wage variation within individual job histories to identify returns to experience. The coefﬁ-
cients βFE and the residual variance σ2
FE are used as the auxiliary parameters. The residual variance of this
ﬁxed effect estimator σ2
FE is expected to be smaller than the residual variance of the OLS σ2
OLS, because
16the individual ﬁxed effect is eliminated in this model. Thus, the difference between two is useful to identify
the dispersion of individual innate ability.
The estimated returns to experience include both within-job wage growth and the wage growth through
job switching. To understand the wage growth structure more deeply, I estimate within-job wage growth
using a ﬁxed effect estimator. Denote the average log wage and tenure of individual i at job j by wij and
TNij. Let ˜ ˜ wijt = wijt − wij be the deviation of log wage from the average over the duration of job j. I
also deﬁne the averages and the deviations for other variables such as TN and  in a similar way. The ﬁxed
effect model for within-job wage growth is given by
˜ ˜ wijt = β1,OJFE






ijt + ˜ ˜ ijt.
4.3.1. Estimates of Auxiliary Parameters. The estimated hazard rates are plotted in ﬁgure 1 through 3.
Some selected numbers are also presented in table 1 for detailed information. The quarterly hazard rate of
non full-time employment at the ﬁrst quarter is 0.51. It decreases to 0.46 in the ﬁfth quarter. The estimates
imply that the average time to ﬁnd a full-time job is about 2 quarters. The quarterly hazard rate of full-time
employment at the ﬁrst quarter is 0.16. It quickly decreases in the ﬁrst few years and drops to 0.05 at the
tenth quarter. The rates seem to be stable around 0.03 after the ﬁfteenth quarter. The hazard rate of full-time
job at the ﬁrst quarter is 0.20, which is higher than the employment hazard rate because some jobs end with
job-to-job switching. Similar to the full-time employment hazard rate, the job hazard rate decreases quickly
in a ﬁrst few years and it drops to 0.07 at the tenth quarter. The pattern found here is very similar to the one
reported by Farber (1999).
The estimated sample auxiliary parameters for wages are presented in table 2. The ﬁrst two columns are
the OLS estimates. The results imply that the average initial log wage is 2.1 (= $8.1) and the average log
wage with ten years experience is 2.6 (= $13.6.) The next two columns present the regression estimates for
within-individual wage growth. The results imply that the average annual return to experience in the ﬁrst
ten years is 0.054. Also notice that the residual variance is smaller than that of OLS, because individual
effect is eliminated in this model. The last two columns show the regression estimates for within-job wage
growth. The results imply that the average annual wage growth rate on the job is 0.033. Again, the residual
variance is smaller than those from OLS and within-individual wage regressions, because both individual
and employer ﬁxed effects are eliminated.
17TABLE 1. Sample Hazard Rates
Note: The hazard rates are estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Non full-time employment includes part-time employment
and unemployment. The standard deviation of the estimated hazard rates is obtained by a nonparametric bootstrap with blocking
for time dimension at the individual level. The number of replications in bootstrap is 10,000. The survival rate of full-time jobs
and full-time employment at 40th quarter is 0.07 and 0.14, respectively. The survival rate of non full-time employment at 5th
quarter is 0.04.
TABLE 2. Sample Auxiliary Parameters
Note: Log of hourly wages deﬂated by 2004 price are regressed on experience (Exp) or tenure (Ten.) Eighteen observations of
hourly wages are higher than $100 and they are excluded from regressions. The ﬁxed effect estimator is used to estimate
within-individual wage growth and within-job wage growth. The standard deviation is obtained by a nonparametric bootstrap with
blocking for time dimension at the individual level. The number of replications in bootstrap is 10,000.
Thedistancebetweenthesampleauxiliaryparametersandthesimulatedcounterpartsisoptimallyweighted
by the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the sample auxiliary parameters. I estimate it by a nonpara-
metric bootstrap with 10,000 replications. To preserve the dependent structure of the data, I sample indi-
viduals with blocking over the time dimension. If a particular individual i is selected, his entire wage and
employment history are included in the sample. There are some advantages using a bootstrap to estimate
the optimal weighting matrix. First, I can avoid small sample bias for second order moments as is pointed
out by Altonji and Segal (1996). Second, analytical solutions to covariance between auxiliary parameters
18can be complex. But I can estimate it through simulation. The estimated standard deviations are presented
in table 1 and 2. Third, no update of the weighting matrix is necessary. This simpliﬁes computation.
The number of auxiliary parameters is 101 (40 from the full-time job hazard rate, 40 from the full-time
employment hazard rate, 5 from the non full-time employment hazard rate, 6 from the OLS wage regression,
5 from the ﬁxed effect model for on-the-job wage growth, 5 from the ﬁxed effect model for overall wage
growth.) The simulated minimum distance estimator ˆ φ is formally given by
ˆ φ = argmin
φ













W∗ = V ar(ˆ ρ)−1.
Remember that ˆ ρ is the sample auxiliary parameter estimated by the observed sample.
4.4. Identiﬁcation. Flinn and Heckman (1982) show that search models are under-identiﬁed if only unem-
ployment duration and initial accepted wages are used. Because employment duration and the subsequent
wages after the initial accepted wages are also used in the estimation, I might be able to fully identify the
model. However, identiﬁcation through such information is not fully studied.7 Thus, following Flinn and
Heckman (1982), I impose three parametric assumptions to satisfy the recoverability condition to assure
the identiﬁcation of the structural parameters. The additional information such as employment duration and
wages other than the initial ones improves the efﬁciency of the estimator. First, I ﬁx the annual discount rate
r at 0.075. They show that it is not separately identiﬁed from the value of unemployment beneﬁt b. Second,
the match quality distribution is assumed to be lognormal. This shape restriction is necessary to identify
the fraction of unaccepted match quality, and thus the rate at which an unemployed worker meets a ﬁrm. In
other words, the reason for unemployment cannot be decomposed into the reservation match quality and job
availability without this shape restriction. Third, the bargaining power of workers β is set to 0.5, because
it is weakly identiﬁed without additional structure.8 Intuitively, it is difﬁcult to distinguish the bargaining
7Barlevy (2005) ﬁnds nonparametric identiﬁcation conditions for a search model without bargaining.
8The main result is reported by assuming β=0.5. I also estimated the model parameters including β and ﬁnd that the results are
little different from the case with ﬁxed bargaining power. See the appendix A.2 for the details.
19power from the size of the ‘pie.’ These parametric assumptions are commonly used in the literature such as
paper by Dey and Flinn (2005).
Although the model is identiﬁed using the parametric assumptions, it is probably worthwhile to intuitively
discuss the identiﬁcation of the bargaining effect on wages. For simplicity, let us suppose that the match-
speciﬁc capital (e.g. tenure effect) does not grow on the job. More general case will be discussed below.
Consider two groups of workers with same general work experience. Workers in the ﬁrst group have worked
for years in the same employer, and thus their tenure is long. Workers in the second group were unemployed,
but they have just found a new job. The bargaining position and the match quality of workers in the former
group are expected to be high, because they stay with the same employer for years for good match quality
and because they should have received many job offers from outside on the job. Thus, the wage growth
of these workers is solely driven by the accumulation of general human capital. On the other hand, on-
the-job wage growth of workers with zero tenure is also driven by the change in bargaining position. The
difference in the average on-the-job wage growth between two groups identiﬁes the wage growth through
bargaining. Notice that workers in both groups are highly experienced, because long tenure implies high
labor market experience. Nevertheless, the estimated effect of bargaining can be applied to inexperienced
workers, because the match quality distribution and the rate at which a worker meets a ﬁrm are same across
workers with different experience, which is also a common identiﬁcation assumption in the search literature.
When match-speciﬁc capital grows over time, its effect on wages must be taken into account in order to
identify the bargaining effect on wages. This effect may not be negligible for workers with zero tenure, while
it probably has little effect for workers with long tenure. The growth of match-speciﬁc capital is included in
themodelsothatmatchqualitywiththecurrentemployerstochasticallygrows. Thisproductivitycomponent
is identiﬁed using job-to-job transition rate. When the growth of match quality is fast, job turnover rate is
strongly decreasing in tenure (i.e., the slope of job hazard rate will be steep.) The contribution of this
component to wage growth is derived from the model, because it explicitly relates productivity to wages.
Thus, the effect of bargaining on wage growth is still identiﬁed by comparing the two groups.
Although I do not have a theorem about the uniqueness of the estimated parameters, I address this poten-
tial problem numerically by using the simulated annealing algorithm
9 in the estimation that is one of global
optimization algorithms. Unlike local optimization algorithms such as Nelder-Mead (simplex) method and
quasi-Newtonalgorithm, aglobaloptimizationalgorithmdoesnotstuckinlocaloptima. Theprobabilitythat
the simulated annealing algorithm terminates with the global optimal solution approaches 1 as the annealing
9See Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) for a detailed discussion. They also provide a FORTRAN software.
20schedule is extended. The parameters are estimated by the simulated annealing with eight different start-
ing parameters. Each run includes about 80,000 function evaluations and converges to the same parameter
values, which strongly supports that the reported parameters uniquely minimize the objective function.
4.5. Estimation Results. The estimation results are presented in table 3. A worker’s productivity grows
by 25% during the ﬁrst ten years of his career through accumulation of general human capital. Notice
that this is not the entire productivity growth of a typical worker with ten years work experience, because
the productivity also grow through match quality change. The value of unemployment beneﬁt amounts to
$5.1 per hour in 2004 dollar. This value is lower than the minimum wage during early 80s, which was
between about $7.00 and $5.50. Those who do not have a full-time job meet 3.8 ﬁrms during a year. Full-
time job holders are contacted by 1.2 ﬁrm during a year. Notice that these numbers are not same as the
number of offers actually made by ﬁrms. In many cases, they immediately separate because they realize
they do not have a good match quality as soon as they meet. The match quality distribution is assumed to
be lognormal. The mean and the standard deviation of log of match quality are 0.52 and 0.32. The rate at
which the match quality grows is about 0.2 for workers whose match quality is at the median of the sampling
distribution. When match quality changes, it improves by 11% (calculated by taking log difference.) Given
these estimates, the average annual match quality growth rate is about 2%. A negative productivity shock
occurs once in every 1.5 years. This negative shock causes a signiﬁcant productivity drop. When a worker-
ﬁrm match is in a bad state, their output is almost zero. Also a match is destroyed due to an exogenous shock
once in 8.4 years. The proportion of high-skilled workers is 67% and they are 56% more productive than
low-skilled workers. Lastly, the lowest wage and the highest wage in the simulation are $4.59 and $39.6,
respectively. This implies that my wage grid is not restrictive, because the grid covers wages between $1.00
and $45.00.
21TABLE 3. Parameter Estimates
Parameter Notation Estimates Std. Dev.




Unemp. Beneﬁt b 5.140 0.657
Poisson Rate Unemp. λ0 3.869 0.322
Emp. λ 1.261 0.088
Separation δ0 0.119 0.004
Match Q. Change δ1a 0.300 0.047
δ1b -0.009 0.002
Prod. Shock δ 1.811 0.107
Type Dist. High-skilled γ0,HIGH 0.566 0.079
Weight pHIGH 0.674 0.175
Shock Dist. Bad θ,BAD -2.739 0.218
Weight pBAD 0.385 0.020
Match Q. Dist. Mean µ 0.523 0.034
Std. Dev. σθ 0.320 0.096
Measurement Error σ 0.250 0.014
Interest Rate: r = 0.075
Bargaining Power: β = 0.5
No. of Moment Conditions: 101
Function Value at the Minimum: 211.648
Note: The coefﬁcients of production function are denoted by γ. The hourly value of unemployment compensation measured in
2004 dollar is b. The annual arrival rate of an offer for those who do not have a full-time job is λ0. The annual offer arrival rate on
the full-time job is λ. The annual arrival rate of an exogenous separation is δ0. The parameters for the annual rate of match quality
change are δ1a and δ1b. The annual arrival rate of productivity shock is δ. The support point for high-skilled individuals and its
weight are denoted by γ0,HIGH and pHIGH. The support point for low-skilled workers are normalized to zero. The support point
for bad (negative) shock and its weight are θ,BAD and PBAD. Those for good (positive) shock are θ,GOOD and PGOOD. I
impose a restriction that the mean of the shock be one for normalization. The location and the scale parameter of match quality
distribution, which is lognormal, are µ and σθ, respectively. The standard deviation of measurement error is σ.
4.6. Model Fit.
4.6.1. Hazard Rates. The sample hazard rates and simulated hazard rates are plotted in ﬁgures 1, 2, and
3. The results indicate that the model captures the basic features of the hazard rates. The hazard rate
of full-time employment is declining because of both duration dependence and heterogeneity. Workers
accumulate human capital through learning-by-doing. This process makes a worker-ﬁrm match more and
more productive. As a consequence, the transition rate from full-time employment to unemployment (or
part-time employment) decreases over time. Matches are heterogeneous in terms of the innate ability and
the experience of the worker and the match quality. Because less efﬁcient matches are destroyed by negative
productivity shocks, the selection mechanism generates declining hazard rate over time.
22TABLE 4. Sample and Simulated Auxiliary Parameters (Hazard Rate)
The full-time job hazard rate decreases over time for a similar reason, but there is one important difference
because this includes job-to-job transition. Observe that human capital and innate ability do not affect the
job-to-job transition rate, because these are transferable across jobs. However, a worker is more likely to
separate from the match and switch to a new job if the match quality is low. This is another source that
generates a declining hazard rate.
23FIGURE 1. Non Full-time Employment Hazard Rate
FIGURE 2. Full-time Employment Hazard Rate
FIGURE 3. Full-time Job Hazard Rate
244.6.2. Wages. The sample and simulated auxiliary parameters of wage regression are presented in table 5.
The prediction of average log wage given experience is reasonably close to the data, as is shown in ﬁgure 4.
The difference between the simulation and the observation is 0.02 when experience is ten years. Notice that
the slope quickly decreases around the point where experience is ﬁve years. This feature cannot be captured
by wage regression if only linear and quadratic terms are used, which is also emphasized by Murphy and
Welch (1990). The prediction of average within-individual wage growth rate also captures the basic features
of the data (see ﬁgure 5), although the simulated wage growth path is less concave than the observation. The
model generates a similar wage growth path to the simulation, partly because human capital accumulation
function includes a quartic term. The difference between the simulated path and the observation is largest at
ﬁve years of experience and it is 0.03. Figure 6 presents within-job wage growth rate. The model captures
the basic patterns of on-the-job wage growth. However, the simulated on-the-job wage growth path is less
concave than the observation: the simulated wage growth is slower than the observed wage growth when
tenure is short, while it is too fast when tenure is long. A possible explanation for the gap between the model
and the observation is that match quality distribution and the rate at which a worker meets a ﬁrm are assumed
to be the same across workers with different experience and tenure. If inexperienced workers (or workers
with short tenure) meet ﬁrms more frequently than experienced workers (or workers with long tenure), the
wages of inexperienced workers will grow more rapidly, which helps the model ﬁtting the observed on-the-
job wage growth path.
TABLE 5. Sample and Simulated Auxiliary Parameters (Wage Regression)
Note: Hourly log-wages are regressed on experience (EXP) or tenure (TEN). For the detailed information on the results for sample
auxiliary parameter estimation, see table 2.
25FIGURE 4. Average Log-wage by Experience
FIGURE 5. Within-Individual Wage Growth Rate
FIGURE 6. Within-Job Wage Growth Rate
265. COUNTERFACTUALS
5.1. Is Improving Outside Option Important? The most interesting feature of the model is that not only
labor productivity, but also the value of outside option changes over time and contributes to wage growth.
The effect of the outside option value on wages can be evaluated by comparing wages with a counterfactual
wage when the outside option is unemployment. The actual (predicted) wage proﬁle and the counterfactual
wage proﬁle are presented in ﬁgure 7. At the initial wage (zero experience) the actual and the counterfactual
wages are same because the actual outside option at the initial wage is unemployment. However, workers
quickly improve their outside options, particularly for the ﬁrst ﬁve years. The actual wage is 15% higher
than the counterfactual wage when workers have ﬁve years of experience. After ﬁve years of experience,
the bargaining position little contributes to wage growth. The cumulative wage growth due to the outside
option value is 16% when experience is ten years. Because wages grow by about 50% during the ﬁrst ten
years, the improved value of outside option can account for about 30% of this wage growth. This simulation
exercise indicates that improving outside option substantially contributes to wage growth of young workers,
particularly in the very early stage of their careers.
5.2. Reducing labor market frictions. Another empirical question of the paper is what the effect of the
labor market frictions on wages is. Due to the labor market frictions, workers have to search for better jobs
and outside options, and bargain wages. In the absence of frictions, workers are able to immediately ﬁnd
FIGURE 7. Wage Proﬁle When Outside Option is Unemployment
27FIGURE 8. Log-Wage Proﬁle in a Labor Market with Few Frictions.
the best match and an alternative job opportunity which is as good as the best one. Thus, the wage growth
is solely driven by the growth of human capital in this economy. By comparing the actual wage proﬁle
with the counterfactual wage proﬁle in the absence of frictions, I can quantify the effect of the labor market
frictions on wages. Since the simulation of the model is carried out in a discrete time model, it is impossible
to simulate an economy with absolutely zero friction. But it is still worth simulating an economy with the
feasibly lowest possible frictions.
To implement the idea, the model is parameterized in the following way. First, workers always have
the best match quality with all ﬁrms. This “best” match quality is at the 97.5% quantile in the estimated
underlying match quality distribution and the idiosyncratic productivity shock is in a good state. In the
simulation of the estimated model, 18.6% of workers have this match quality when they have ten years of
work experience. Second, workers meet one ﬁrm in every quarter regardless of their employment status.
So the parameters are set so that λ0 = λ = 4. Remember that Poisson processes are approximated by the
corresponding Bernoulli processes and that the decision period is a quarter. This parameterization implies
that the probability that a worker and a ﬁrm meet in a quarter is 1. Third, workers do not lose a job. In a
labor market without frictions, workers are able to ﬁnd a job immediately even if they lose one. To bring
about this situation in a discrete time model, the parameters are set so that δ0 = δ = 0. All other parameters
remain the same as the estimated model.
28The simulated wage proﬁles are presented in ﬁgure 8. There are two interesting features. First, the wage
growth in the frictional labor market is more rapid than the wage growth without frictions. In the absence of
frictions, wage growth is solely driven by the growth of human capital. To the contrary, in a frictional labor
market, workers are improving their match quality and the value of outside option, which also increases their
wages. The wage gap between two wage proﬁles is quickly decreasing during the ﬁrst ﬁve years by about
25% (measured by log difference) and the remaining gap is little reduced after that. Because the observed
wage growth rate during the ﬁrst ten years is about 50%, labor market frictions account for about a half of
the observed wage growth during this period. This estimate is greater than the number claimed by Topel and
Ward (1992), which is about a third, because they do not take into account the effect of the improved value of
outside option. The second interesting feature of the comparison of two wage proﬁles in ﬁgure 8 is that the
wage gap remains unﬁlled even after ten years of job search. This is explained by the average productivity
of worker-ﬁrm matches. In a labor market without frictions, workers are always assigned to the best match.
But, in a frictional labor market, workers are occasionally taken away from a job due to productivity shocks
even if they once ﬁnd the best match quality. Thus, the average match quality in a frictional labor market is
strictly lower than the best match quality even after several years of job search.
5.3. No Human Capital Growth. Yet another counterfactual is simulated to examine the effect of human
capital accumulation on wages and job search behavior. In this simulation, workers do not accumulate their
human capital, which has two implications. First, wages, as well as labor productivity, grow slowly because
only job search and bargaining improve the continuation value for workers. Second, the reservation match
quality is increased because a lack of human capital growth reduces the value of a worker-ﬁrm match while
the value of unemployment is little reduced. As a result, unemployment spells become longer than those in
the standard case. This counterfactual experiment is implemented by setting γi = 0 for i = 1,··· ,4. All
other parameters remain the same as the estimated model.
There are two interesting features in the simulated log wage proﬁles in ﬁgure 9. First, the initial wages
are increased by about 15% if human capital does not grow. This high initial wages are consequences of a
high reservation match quality. Remember that the continuation value for the worker is proportional to the
sum of the current wage and the expected future income gains as shown in proposition 2.1. When human
capital does not grow, the value of a match is reduced for a given level of match quality. Because the value
of unemployment changes little, workers have to wait for a higher match quality to start a job. Since the
initial match quality is high, there is not much room for the match quality to be improved through on-the-job
search. This high reservation match quality and a lack of human capital accumulation decrease the expected
29FIGURE 9. Log-Wage Proﬁle with No Human Capital Growth.
TABLE 6. Log-Wage Proﬁle with No Human Capital Growth.
future income gains. When the changes of continuation value for the worker are small and the expected
future income gains decrease a lot, the current wage has to increase. In other words, when workers cannot
expect high income in the future, they must be compensated by a high wage today. This is why the initial
wages are higher when human capital does not accumulate.
Second, wages grow slowly in the absence of human capital growth. Speciﬁcally, wages grow only by
15% on average during the ﬁrst ten years of careers (see table 6.) This is partly due to my speciﬁcation of
multiplicative production technology, but a high reservation match quality is also the reason. When workers
start with a high match quality, there is not much room to improve match quality through job search. These
explanations also account for the difference in wage growth rate between low-skilled workers and high-
skilled workers. High-skilled workers are not only more productive, but also have a lower reservation match
quality than low-skilled workers, as shown in table 7.
30TABLE 7. Reservation Match Quality.
Note: The reservation match quality depends on the state of idiosyncratic shock. The ranks in the
discretized match quality space are in parenthesis (20 is the highest.)
FIGURE 10. Unemployment Hazard Rate
The increased reservation match quality also results in a longer unemployment duration. In the standard
simulation with human capital growth, the predicted unemployment hazard rate in the ﬁrst quarter is 0.48.
But it decreases to 0.39 if human capital does not accumulate. In my simulations, the average unemployment
duration increases from 2.1 quarters to 2.5 quarters.
Through this simulation exercise I ﬁnd that human capital accumulation affects wage growth not only by
its direct effect on the current labor productivity, but also by its indirect effect on job search behavior due to
low future productivity.
316. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate wage dynamics using a model of wage bargaining
with on-the-job search. This is a departure from the conventional wage growth literature in the sense that
I consider a new component of wage growth: the improved value of outside option. The model improves
on previous work in two respects: it allows for productivity growth, and it deals with wage renegotiation
following productivity shocks. These changes make the model analytically complex and the equilibrium
wage is numerically solved rather than using the explicit wage solution used in previous work. However,
the ﬁrst change allows me to examine the effect of general human capital growth, which makes a substantial
contribution to wage growth. I ﬁnd that human capital accumulation affects wage proﬁle by changing job
search behavior as well as labor productivity itself. The model also generates a wage decrease on the job
and endogenous separation due to productivity shocks. Both of these are necessary to match the observed
wage dynamics and worker mobility.
The model captures important features of wage dynamics and worker mobility in the NLSY 79. The
empirical results show that the contributions of job search and bargaining to wage growth is signiﬁcant. The
improved value of outside option accounts for about 30% of the observed wage growth during the ﬁrst ten
years. This paper also quantiﬁes the effect of human capital on wage growth and search behavior. Without
human capital accumulation, the reservation match quality is increased, which results in 15% higher initial
wage and only 15% of wage growth in the ﬁrst ten years. The results suggest a tight relationship between
human capital accumulation and job search.
This paper provides a detailed econometric model of bargaining with on-the-job search that allows for
rich forms of heterogeneity and time-varying productivity components. Nevertheless, there are important
extensions that will be addressed in the future work. First the role of fellow workers in wage bargaining
is ignored. Large ﬁrms can easily replace their employees from their internal labor market. Thus, the
bargaining position of the worker tends to be low in larger ﬁrms. Second, parametric assumption for match
quality distribution is strong. The assumption of lognormality is common in the literature, but there are a
number of possible alternative assumptions. Nonparametric identiﬁcation might be possible using the idea
of record statistics, which is proposed by Barlevy (2005) for a job search model without bargaining.
APPENDIX A.
A.1. Alternative Bargaining Assumption. In this paper wages are assumed to be constant until renegoti-
ation. However, this is not the only possible assumption. Alternative assumption is that wage is a product
32of efﬁciency unit of labor and its price and that the price of efﬁciency unit of labor is constant until renego-
tiation. In this alternative speciﬁcation, wages grow over time without renegotiation as workers accumulate
their human capital. Let q be the price of efﬁciency unit of labor and y be the labor productivity. The ﬂow
wage payment is then w = qy. In bargaining, the price is set so that the continuation value of the worker
coincides with the equilibrium payoff in the bargaining. Suppose that the wage is determined through bar-
gaining among three players, and that the type-Θ ﬁrm wins and the type-Θ0 ﬁrm loses. The equilibrium
price q∗ satisﬁes
U(h,Θ,q∗) = βJ(Θ,h) + (1 − β)J(Θ0,h).
Similar to the equation (1), this equilibrium price q∗ is also determined uniquely.
One advantage of this speciﬁcation is that wage decomposition is straightforward. Assuming the produc-
tion technology is given by equation (2), wages can be decomposed as
lnw = γ0,i + γ1h + γ2h2 + γ3h3 + γ4h4 + θ + θ + lnq(h,Θ,Θ0)
where q only captures the effect of change in outside option value. For normalization, the lowest price q is
set 0.01 and the highest price ¯ q is set 1.00, because price and labor productivity are not separately identiﬁed.
A.1.1. EstimationResults. Theestimationresultsarepresentedintable8. Aworker’sproductivitygrowsby
30% during the ﬁrst ten years of his career through accumulation of general human capital. This estimated
human capital accumulation process is similar to that in the original model. The value of unemployment
beneﬁtamountsto$7.9perhourin2004dollar. Thosewhodonothaveafull-timejobmeet3.95ﬁrmsduring
a year. Full-time job holders are contacted by 1.24 ﬁrms during a year. The match quality distribution is
assumed to be lognormal. The mean and the standard deviation of log of match quality are 1.44 and 0.36.
The estimated mean of log match quality is much larger than the original counterpart, but this is due to
normalization. A productivity shock occurs once in every 2 years. When a worker-ﬁrm match is in a bad
state, their output is reduced by 66%. But this negative shock is smaller than that of the original model,
which reduces productivity by 93%. This difference is the most signiﬁcant one between the original model
and the alternative model. I will discuss its implication in the next subsection. Also a match is destroyed due
to an exogenous shock once in 6.32 years. The proportion of high-skilled workers is 39% and they are 61%
more productive than low-skilled workers, which implies that the distribution of worker types is skewed to
the left.
33TABLE 8. Parameter Estimates
Parameter Notation Estimates Std. Dev.




Unemp. Beneﬁt b 7.894 0.863
Poisson Rate Unemp. λ0 3.950 0.502
Emp. λ 1.236 0.091
Separation δ0 0.158 0.004
Match Q. Change δ1a 1.237 0.080
δ1b -0.027 0.004
Prod. Shock δ 0.509 0.068
Type Dist. High-skilled γ0,HIGH 0.591 0.063
Weight pHIGH 0.618 0.094
Shock Dist. Bad θ,BAD -1.080 0.130
Weight pBAD 0.148 0.020
Match Q. Dist. Mean µ 1.439 0.117
Std. Dev. σθ 0.361 0.029
Interest Rate: r = 0.05
Bargaining Power: β = 0.5
No. of Moment Conditions: 101
Function Value at the Minimum: 524.5206
Note: The coefﬁcients of production function are denoted by γ. The hourly value of unemployment compensation measured in
2004 dollar is b. The annual arrival rate of an offer for those who do not have a full-time job is λ0. The annual offer arrival rate on
the full-time job is λ. The annual arrival rate of an exogenous separation is δ0. The parameters for the annual rate of match quality
change are δ1a and δ1b. The annual arrival rate of productivity shock is δ. The support point for high-skilled individuals and its
weight are denoted by γ0,HIGH and pHIGH. The support point for low-skilled workers are normalized to zero. The support point
for bad (negative) shock and its weight are θ,BAD and PBAD. Those for good (positive) shock are θ,GOOD and PGOOD. I
impose a restriction that the mean of the shock be one for normalization. The location and the scale parameter of match quality
distribution, which is lognormal, are µ and σθ, respectively.
A.1.2. Model Fit. The sample hazard rates and the simulated hazard rates are plotted in ﬁgures 11, 12, and
13. The simulated non full-time employment hazard rate presents the downward trend. It is 0.46 at the ﬁrst
quarter and it declines to 0.43 in the ﬁfth quarter. The level of the non full-time employment hazard rate and
the trend are similar to the observed patterns in the data. However, the simulated employment hazard rate
does not ﬁt to the data quite well. In particular, the simulated hazard rate does not have a downward trend:
it is around 0.04 in all periods. Because the annual Poisson rate for the exogenous separation is about 0.16,
no endogenous separations occur in my simulation. This simulation result implies that the estimated model
does not have sufﬁciently large negative productivity shock to generate endogenous separation. However, if
the model had a larger negative productivity shock, it would drive too much ﬂuctuation in wages, because all
changes in productivity translate into wages in this alternative speciﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, the residual
34TABLE 9. Sample and Simulated Auxiliary Parameters (Hazard Rate)
variance in wage regressions would be too high, if a larger negative productivity shock existed. Unless ex-
ogenous separation rate is directly related to work experience, the model cannot match both the employment
hazard rate and the wage variance at the same time if I assume agents negotiate the price of efﬁciency unit
of labor.
The simulated job hazard rate presents a downward trend. But the slope is less steep than the observed
counterpart. Because the workers with low match quality are more likely to make job turnover, the sim-
ulated job-to-job transition rate is decreasing in job tenure, which results in a downward job hazard rate.
However, the slope is not steep enough because the model does not generate transitions from employment
to unemployment.
The sample and simulated auxiliary parameters of wage regression are presented in table 10. The sim-
ulated variance of residual in each wage regression is close to the observed counterpart. The prediction of
average log wage given experience is reasonably close to the data, as is shown in ﬁgure 14. The difference
between the simulation and the observation is 0.03 when experience is ten years. The prediction of average
within-individual wage growth rate also captures the basic features of the data (see ﬁgure 15), although the
simulated wage growth rate is faster than the observation. The difference between the simulated path and
the observed path is largest at seven years of experience and it is 0.03. Figure 16 presents within-job wage
growth rate. Similarly, the simulated on-the-job wage growth rate is faster than the observation. The gap at
ﬁve years of tenure is 0.04.
A.1.3. Wage Growth Decomposition. The estimated parameters are used for wage growth decomposition.
Because wage is a product of efﬁciency unit of labor and its price, log wage at period t can be written as
lnwt = γ0 + γ1ht + γ2h2
t + γ3h3
t + γ4h4
t + θt + θ,t + lnq(ht,Θt,Θ0
t)
35FIGURE 11. Non full-time employment Hazard Rate
FIGURE 12. Full-time Employment Hazard Rate
FIGURE 13. Full-time Job Hazard Rate
36FIGURE 14. Average Log-wage by Experience
FIGURE 15. Within-Individual Wage Growth Rate
FIGURE 16. Within-Job Wage Growth Rate
37TABLE 10. Sample and Simulated Auxiliary Parameters (Wage Regression)
Note: Hourly log-wages are regressed on experience (EXP) or tenure (TEN). For the detailed information on the results for sample
auxiliary parameter estimation, see table 2.
TABLE 11. Wage Growth Decomposition
where Θt = (θt,θ,t) is a pair of match quality and productivity shock for the employer and Θ0 is that for
the potential employer. Let wh,t = γ1ht +γ2h2
t +γ3h3
t +γ4h4
t be the contribution of general human capital
to log wage. Similarly, the contributions of match speciﬁc capital Θ and the price of efﬁciency unit of labor
q to log wage are denoted by wΘ,t = θt + θ,t and wq,t = lnqt, respectively. The wage growth rate from
period t to period t + 1 can be decomposed into the general human capital effect, the match speciﬁc capital
effect, and the price effect:
lnwt+1 − lnwt = ∆wh,t + ∆wΘ,t + ∆wq,t.
The results of a wage growth decomposition are summarized in table 11. The average simulated wage
growth rate for the ﬁrst ten years is 0.57, which is only 0.03 higher than the observation. The growth of
general human capital explains the largest part of the wage growth and it accounts for about 55% of the
observed wage growth. The second largest component of wage growth is match speciﬁc human capital,
which accounts for 43% of the observation. The price effect is quite small and it accounts for 2% only.
38A.1.4. Remark. I have examined alternative speciﬁcation in which agents negotiate the price of efﬁciency
unit of labor, rather than wage. Although this speciﬁcation provides a straightforward wage growth decom-
position, the model does not ﬁt the observed patterns in the data. More speciﬁcally, the model does not
match the employment hazard rate and the wage variance simultaneously. In this speciﬁcation, all variations
in productivity are translated into variations in wages. If I allow for endogenous separation and the model
matches the observed employment hazard rate, the model generates too large wage variance compared with
the observed wage variance. In contrast, my original speciﬁcation in which agents negotiate wages ﬁts
both the employment hazard rate and the wage variance simultaneously, because productivity is not directly
translated into wages.
A.2. Additional Estimation Results. For the main results of the paper, the bargaining power parameter is
ﬁxed at 0.5. To be able to estimate the bargaining power in a reliable way, employer side information should
be used. But, it is not included in the NLSY. However, I also attempt to estimate the parameters including
bargaining power to see how other parameter estimates but bargaining power are affected. The results are
summarized in table 12. The estimated bargaining power is 0.49, which is close to the parameterized value
of 0.5. Hence, other parameter estimates are also close to those in the main results.
A.3. Details of Data Set Construction.
A.3.1. Weekly Job Information. First I collect information about each job. In particular, I am interested
in (1) the start week of the job, (2) the end week of the job, (3) wages, and (4) hours worked per week.
To determine the start and the end week of a job, I collect information from the most recent survey. I use
white male high school graduates in this analysis. High school graduates are deﬁned as individuals who
have high school diploma but did not pursue further formal education until the most recent survey year.
There are 950 white male high school graduates in my sample and they had 10,128 jobs in total. Because an
individual may have a job for more than one survey year, I have multiple observations for each job. I have
24,565 observations in my sample. To reduce the initial condition problems, I need information about the
transition from school to work. I omit individuals who graduated high school before January 1978, which
is earlier than the ﬁrst survey year. This condition leaves me 18,114 observations for 685 individuals and
7,780 jobs. Because I am interested in jobs after the transition to labor market is made, I omit jobs that
ended before graduating. I have 16,364 observations for 684 individuals and 6,555 jobs after imposing this
condition. Next I omit self-employment jobs and jobs without pay. Then I have 15,695 observations for 684
individuals and 6,417 jobs.
39TABLE 12. Parameter Estimates
Parameter Notation Estimates Std. Dev.




Unemp. Beneﬁt b 4.620 1.174
Poisson Rate Unemp. λ0 3.673 0.270
Emp. λ 1.143 0.084
Separation δ0 0.117 0.005
Match Q. Change δ1a 0.312 0.037
δ1b -0.010 0.001
Prod. Shock δ 1.969 0.114
Type Dist. High-skilled γ0,HIGH 0.653 0.105
Weight pHIGH 0.772 0.101
Shock Dist. Bad θ,BAD -2.755 0.338
Weight pBAD 0.392 0.028
Match Q. Dist. Mean µ 0.486 0.024
Std. Dev. σθ 0.402 0.074
Measurement Error σ 0.252 0.018
Bargaining Power β 0.494 0.060
Interest Rate: r = 0.075
No. of Moment Conditions: 101
Function Value at the Minimum: 205.847
Note: See table 3.
I determine whether a job is full-time or not by taking the average hours over all observations for each job.
A full-time job is deﬁned to be a job that individuals work at for 30 hours per week or more. The number
of hours per week worked is topcoded so that it does not exceed 96 hours before the average is calculated.
My model precludes a transition between part-time and full-time without changing employer. I expect that
this does not cause a serious bias, because more than 90% of jobs (5,914 jobs) did not have such switching.
Omitting all part-time jobs, I have 13,686 observations for 678 individuals and 5,388 full-time jobs in the
sample.
Dual Jobs. Several individuals have more than one job at the same time. In particular, there are some short
term full-time jobs that are started and ended while an individual holds a primary full-time job. I omit these
short term jobs for two reasons. First, these jobs may be misclassiﬁed as full-time because individuals are
unlikely to have two or more full-time jobs. Second, even if they are correctly classiﬁed, those secondary
jobs are temporary and less important for an individual’s career. There are 601 secondary jobs and the
median duration of a job is 17 weeks (the mean duration is 34 weeks.) On the other hand, there are 4,787
primary jobs and the median duration of a job is 51 weeks (the mean duration is 126 weeks.)
40TABLE 13. The number of observations.
Some jobs are started before old jobs are ended. To reconcile the gap between the data and the model,
I move the start week of a job, while the end week of a job is not edited. If there are two jobs that have
overlapping periods, I assume that the second job started right after the ﬁrst job is ended. There are 250
jobs (about 5% of all jobs) of which start weeks have to move. The median change is 15 weeks (mean is 34
weeks.)
After all the operations described above, I have 12,846 observations for 678 individuals and 4,787 jobs.
The information is used to construct a quarterly job array in the followings.
Job-to-Job Transition Indicator. As is mentioned in the main text, I say that an individual makes a job-to-job
transition if (1) he spends three weeks or less before he starts working for a new job and (2) he leaves the
job voluntarily. Otherwise, I say that an individual changes jobs via non full-time employment. Under this
deﬁnition, I ﬁnd that 1,612 jobs are started as job-to-job transitions, while 2,480 jobs are not. If I change the
search duration from three weeks to two weeks, 1,461 jobs are started as job-to-job transition. If I change
the search duration from three weeks to four weeks, 1,694 jobs are started as job-to-job transition.
A.3.2. Quarterly Work History Array. Using the information constructed in the previous subsection, I con-
struct a quarterly work history array for each individual. A quarter consists of 13 weeks. The quarterly labor
force status of an individual is determined by the labor force status of the ﬁrst week in a given quarter. This
implicitly assumes that the labor force status does not change during a quarter, although it may for some
short term jobs. It is true that I could avoid this discretization bias by making the decision period shorter,
but that may cause another problem. Weekly work history data would contain more noise. As Neal (1999)
points out, NLSY work history ﬁle includes measurement errors. As I make the decision period shorter, I
may pick up every noise contained in the data. Aggregating the weekly information to quarter may mod-
erate the bias. In addition, using shorter decision period can be computationally expensive and make my
estimation intractable.
41Entry and Exit from the Full-time Labor Market. I trace each individual from his initial long-term transition
to the full-time labor market until he exits from the full-time labor market or the survey ends. The deﬁnition
of an initial long-term transition to the full-time labor market is similar to that of Farber and Gibbons (1996).
I consider an individual has made this transition if he works for six or more quarters during three years.
Exit from the full-time labor market occurs when an individual does not work at a full-time job for three
years or more. If this is observed in the data, I record his separation from a job and drop the information
after that. Re-entry to the full-time labor market is not included in my sample, because I do not have any
information about when individuals re-entered the labor market, i.e., the time job search is re-started.
Wages. Hourly wages are computed by dividing weekly earnings by hours worked per week. If those are
not recorded on a weekly basis, such as monthly or annual, I convert them to weekly data. Wages are
deﬂated by monthly CPI (the average in 2004 is set to 100.) If an individual had a job that ended before the
interview week, I use the wage is observed in the last week of the job. Otherwise, I use the wage observed
in the interview week. In both cases, I assume that the wage is constant during the quarter that includes
the week when wage is observed. When I need to move the starting date of the job as I explained above,
the wage observation is also moved. I keep the link between employment record and corresponding wage
observations.
Variables for Auxiliary Models. My auxiliary parameters are hazard rates and conditional mean and variance
of wage given experience and tenure. To compute the auxiliary parameters, I need full-time job spells, full-
time employment spells, non full-time employment spells, wages, and the corresponding experience and
tenure.
Job spells, Full-time Employment spells, and Non Full-time Employment spells. Using the quarterly work
history array made above, I construct full-time job spells, full-time employment spells, and non full-time
employment spells. A full-time job spell ends when an individual switches to a new job or loses full-time
employment status (his new status is non full-time employment.) On the other hand, a full-time employment
spell ends only when an individual does not have a full-time job any more. Thus, the difference between job
spells and employment spells is whether they include job-to-job transitions. A non full-time employment
spell ends if an individual who does not have a full-time job ﬁnds a new full-time job.
Work Experience. All individuals start their career with zero experience and zero tenure, regardless of their
actual experience recorded in original NLSY work history ﬁle. I construct these variables using only my
quarterly work history array. It is important to make my variables consistent with my model. Otherwise
I would be unable to interpret the data in terms of my model. As it is assumed in my theoretical model,
42FIGURE 17. The difference in work experience when part-time jobs are not counted.
experience does not depreciate. So, experience is the cumulative number of quarters that an individual had
a full-time job in the past.
A.3.3. Sensitivity Checks. One major concern is a potential bias introduced by ignoring all part-time job
experience. I constructed another quarterly work history array that includes part-time jobs. The differences
from the original array are the following. First, if individuals have both a full-time job and a part-time job in
a given week, only the full-time job is recorded in weekly work history array. Then I convert it to a quarterly
array. Second, I assume part-time experience accounts for a half of full-time experience.
Using this quarterly work history array I construct two different measures of work experience: one in-
cludes both full-time and part-time job experience, and another includes full-time job experience only. The
paths of the two different measures are reported in ﬁgure 17. If I include part-time jobs, the average work
experience is 7.4 years ten years after graduating, while it is 6.9 years if I do not include part-time jobs.
Even 20 years after graduating, the difference is small and it is 0.8 years. This result suggests that the bias
from ignoring part-time jobs is negligibly small.
I also present the proportion of all jobs that are part-time in ﬁgure 18. Part-time jobs are quite common
among the young. About a half of job holders worked in part-time jobs right after graduating. After a year,
the proportion of all jobs that are part-time quickly drops to 23% and it continues to decrease. This pattern
is consistent with the result found by Klerman and Karoly (1994). This result implies that part-time jobs are
common only within a couple of years after graduating.
A.4. Numerical Issues.
43FIGURE 18. Ratio of Part-time Jobs
A.4.1. Optimal Weighting Matrix. The optimal weighting matrix used in a simulated minimum distance
estimator is given by the covariance matrix of the sample auxiliary parameters. I ﬁrst introduce some
notations. Let Wi = {wi,t}
Ti
t=1 be the wage history of individual i from the initial period (t = 1) to the last
period included in my sample (t = Ti.) Although subscripts for a job are omitted, this wage history includes




j=1 be the vector of job spells that individual i have worked at.




k=1 be the vector
of full-time employment spells for individual i where Fi is the number of full-time employment spells of




l=1 be the vector of non full-time employment spells for individual i where Ni
is the number of non full-time employment spells of individual i. Finally, let Di = {Wi,dJ
i ,dF
i ,dN
i } be the
work history of individual i and let D = {Di}N
i=1 be the whole sample.
Thecovariancematrixofthesampleauxiliaryparametersisestimatedusingnonparametricbootstrapwith
blocking at the individual level. Speciﬁcally, I draw Di for N times with replacement. This is important to
preserve the dependent structure of the data. For example, I assume that wages are serially correlated due
to the individual ﬁxed effect and the employer ﬁxed effect. Another example is that full-time job spells and
full-time employment spells are positively correlated, because a long job spell necessarily implies a long
employment spell. Also, the model predicts that wages and job spells are positively correlated, because
workers with high match quality earn high wages and they are likely to remain in the job longer.
The B-th bootstrapped data set DB is used to compute the auxiliary parameters ˆ ρB. I replicate the
bootstrap for 1,000 times and compute the covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters. Although this
44computation takes about an hour for a 2-GHz CPU machine, it is worth doing because the estimated co-
variance matrix can be used for many different speciﬁcations of the structural model. This is very useful
because I have to estimate models with different preﬁxed parameters such as bargaining power parameter β
for sensitivity checks.
There are a few reasons that a nonparametric bootstrap should be used to estimate the optimal weighting
matrix. First, thismatrixcanbecomputedevenwhentheanalyticalformisverycomplex. Onesuchexample
is the covariance between the coefﬁcients of wage regression (e.g., βOLS) and the hazard rates (e.g., pJ,t.)
However I can still compute it through simulation in a straightforward way. Second, the weighting matrix
does not have to be updated over during the iteration in the estimation of structural parameters. This reduces
the computational burden.
A.4.2. Minimizing the Objective Function Value. The objective function is not smooth in the structural
parameters, because actions of simulated agents are discrete such as whether or not to change jobs. The
equilibrium wages of agents are also chosen from the discretized wage grid. Suppose a simulated agent
does not change his action if I change the structural parameter values from φ to φ + , but he changes the
action if I further change the parameter to φ + 2. This discrete response makes the objective function
non-smooth through the auxiliary parameters. It is true that this non-smoothness vanishes as the number
of simulations is increased up to inﬁnity, but there are limitations for computational time and for computer
memory to store actions of simulated agents. I could not make the objective function smooth enough to use
a quasi-Newton method.
For the minimization of the objective function, I use a simulated annealing.10 The method is robust to
a non-smooth objective function and it works well for my model. Alternative algorithm that can be used
for a non-smooth function is the Nelder-Mead simplex method. But, it converges to one of local minima,
presumably because the surface of the objective function is too noisy. This problem still happens when the
number of simulation is 100, but I could not increase it given my computational resources. The additional
advantage of simulated annealing is that it searches for the global minimum. The global optimum can be
found as the number of iteration goes to inﬁnity. The main disadvantage is that simulated annealing often
requires several ten thousands of iterations to achieve convergence. In particular, about 80,000 iterations are
needed for my model, which takes me three days.
10Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) implemented a FORTRAN software that is downloadable from http://www.netlib.org.
45A.4.3. Standard Deviation of the Structural Parameters. Non-smoothness of the objective function is also
problematic when I estimate asymptotic standard deviations of the structural parameters, because Jacobian
of the objective function has to be computed. Remember that the objective function is not differentiable due
to discontinuous responses of simulated agents. The most formal method for this problem is to use a non-
parametric bootstrap. However, it would take me a year for about 100 replications, which is not tractable. A
practical solution here is to compute the Jacobian using a ﬁnite difference method with assuming smooth-
ness. This should work well when the number of simulations is large enough, because the discontinuity
vanishes as the number of simulations is increased to inﬁnity. If this is not the case, the estimated standard
deviations can be extremely small particularly when the step size for derivative is small. The reason is that
the ﬁnite difference method captures a noise on the surface of the objective function and that the absolute
value of the computed derivative is very large.
Different step sizes are tested to see how the estimated standard deviations change. As a reference point,
the ﬁnal step size of simulated annealing is used because it reﬂects the surface of the objective function
around the minimum. I will also check the validity of the method in a little informal way. I will estimate
the structural parameters using nonparametric bootstrap with a small number of replications, say, ten times.
This should not be used to make a formal inference for the estimates. But it is worth doing to compare the
results obtained by a ﬁnite difference method and those obtained by a bootstrap. If these two sets of results
are very different, a different step size should be used.
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